Amir Saemi, "Morality and Revelation in Islamic Thought and Beyond: A New Problem of Evil"

Oxford University Press, 2023

By Amir Saemi

Believers often draw their ethical beliefs from their readings of Scripture. For example, according to the Pew Research Center, 60% of Americans who read Scripture at least once in a week, and 55% of Americans who believe that Scripture should be taken literally, hold that homosexuality should be discouraged. Those who hold this view typically hold that Scripture includes passages on immorality of homosexuality that cannot be interpreted otherwise, that Scripture is the word of God, and that God is an overriding source of morality. One does not need to subscribe to divine command theory to believe that God’s moral injunctions should be followed (and let’s assume that DCT is false). God’s omniscience and omnibenevolent seem to entail that God’s moral statements must be true and thus have moral authority over us.  

However, various Scriptures, including the Qur’an and the Bible, contain passages that appear to contradict modern moral sensibilities, confounding modern believers in their quest to align their values with Scripture. To give just one example, the Quran says, “As for those from women you fear disloyalty, admonish them, and abandon them in their beds, then strike them” (4:34), and the Bible says, “Now as the church submits to Christ, so also wives should submit to their husbands in everything. (Ephesians 5:22–25)”. Modern theists have argued that there are always alternative nonliteral interpretations of controversial passages that align with modern moral sensibilities. However, in the prologue of the book, I argue that those modern interpretations are often inadequate. Furthermore, the optimism that there are always textual reasons to adopt a nonliteral interpretation of morally controversial Scriptural passages is in principle unwarranted.

Let’s then consider a scenario where certain morally controversial Scriptural passages lack textual justification for a nonliteral interpretation. An argument arises that this scenario, combined with the assumption of Scripture's divinity, conflicts with the reliability of our moral judgments made independently of Scripture – let's label this the problem of divinely prescribed evil.

Here’s the essence of the argument: Let’s assume that our obligations are determined by all reasons available to us. Drawing a parallel to the principle of evidence of evidence, we can assert that, in the realm of moral obligations and permissions, there's virtually no distinction between evidence of a fact that is a reason to φ with a certain weight and evidence of the fact that there is a reason to φ with the same weight. They both ground obligations. Conceivably, there might be hidden reasons underlying obligations of which we are unaware. However, when Scripture mandates an obligation to perform φ, it implies the presence of a reason, even if we don’t know precisely what that reason is. Thus, Scriptural evidence reveals obligations that were previously unknown, leading to conflicts between Scriptural directives and our independent moral judgments. In such scenarios, the reliability of our independent moral judgments must be questioned by the theist and morally controversial passages accepted at face value, thereby giving rise to a new problem of evil.

While it's commonly assumed that Islamic philosophers tend to favor reason over religion in the debate between the two, my arguments in the first part of the book challenge this assumption in the practical domain. I contend that when confronted with moral judgments that conflict with Scripture, Islamic philosophers and theologians from various schools resolve the conflict by questioning the reliability of our independent moral judgments. To do so, the Ashʿarites, exemplified by figures like al-Ghazali, employ a consequentialist argument, while the Muʿtazilites, such as Abd al-Jabbar, lean on a deontic theory. Greek-influenced philosophers such as al-Farabi and Averroes utilize their virtue theory framework to arrive at a similar conclusion. The overarching conclusion of Part 1 is that the Islamic tradition often adopts a Scripture-first approach in addressing the problem of divinely prescribed evil. This means that Scripture is given precedence over our independent moral judgments, and in cases of conflict, the latter must be questioned.

Part 2 of the book delves into the exploration of Ethics-first solutions to the problem of prescribed Evil. Ethics-first solutions revolve around upholding the reliability of our independent judgments even in the face of conflicting divine commands.

One such solution involves defending the rationality of our independent moral judgments. In Chapter 4, I argue that there exist scenarios in which deferring to the testimony of a moral expert would be unwise.  These scenarios often involve high stakes cases, where following expert testimony could lead to significant wrongdoing, if the testimony turns out to be mistaken. In such uncertain instances, I argue that it is rational to prioritize our moral intuitions over deference to expert opinion, allowing our actions to be guided, in a de re manner, by moral objects rather than solely by the de dicto dictates of morality, as stated by the expert. Consequently, cases involving morally controversial passages can be interpreted as instances where, irrespective of the objective validity of our independent moral judgments, it is rational to live by them.

I also argue that not only, due to uncertainty, are we rational to live by our own moral judgments, but there are also reasons to be optimistic about moral knowledge – that our moral obligations and permissions are, in principle, knowable by us. While one might argue that Scripture can inform us that there are reasons of which we are not aware, I counter that our moral obligations cannot be contingent upon reasons that are inaccessible to us. If this is the case, then no hidden moral facts or reports thereof can alter our moral knowledge. Moreover, this optimism is in line with the spirit of some work in the Muʿtazilite tradition.

Where does this leave us with the problem of divinely prescribed evil? If our moral judgments are reliable, and Scripture is the word of God, and there are no textual reasons to reinterpret morally controversial passages, the theist is confronted with the notion that normative injunctions of Scripture, when conflicting with our own moral judgments, may not necessarily be moral injunctions. I propose that the theist can interpret Scripture's injunctions as legal mandates, expressed using moral concepts and proposed by the prophet to address the moral challenges of their society. To illustrate, let's consider the Geneva Conventions. Drawing on the work of Jeff McMahan, many philosophers argue that the Geneva Conventions are morally flawed, yet they serve a moral purpose. While they are false as moral claims, the Geneva Conventions can practically help alleviate the suffering of war. Similarly, I suggest that the theist is not compelled to view Scripture's injunctions as inherently having moral content; rather, they could be seen as legal statutes designed for a specific society, which, while not morally ideal, may serve a moral function.

Allow me to conclude by highlighting two points regarding this solution to the problem of prescribed evil. Firstly, while I advocate for optimism concerning our knowledge of human morality, the theist can still maintain a skeptical stance regarding the knowledge of God’s reasons. This perspective is particularly advantageous for a theist seeking to address the classical problem of evil through the lens of skeptical theism. Secondly, optimism about our moral knowledge does not render Scripture morally ineffective. It can still serve as a source of moral motivation, aid in resolving various coordination problems for group activities, offer spiritual guidance, establish the foundation of our relationship with God, promote devotional values, and present a religious perspective on nature that can serve as the basis for a non-anthropomorphic ethics. Therefore, Ethics-first solutions, hopefully, help the progressive theist to navigate the challenges posed by the problem of divinely prescribed evil while still finding value in Scripture's teachings.