Byeong D. Lee (Sungkyunkwan University), “A Kantian Critique of Benatar’s Argument from the Cosmic Perspective”
The Philosophical Forum, 2023
David Benatar, in his books “Better Never to Have Been” (2006) and “The Human Predicament” (2017), argues that our lives lack cosmic meaning and are so bad that it would be better not to procreate. On his view, our lives lack cosmic meaning mainly for two reasons: first, they are not part of a grand design or greater purpose, but instead products of blind evolution; second, our lives can hardly make a significant difference to the universe.
This paper argues that neither the fact that human life is a product of blind evolution nor our inability to significantly impact the universe justifies that our lives are overall bad.
Wilfrid Sellars (1963) distinguishes between the realm of law and the logical space of reasons. The former concerns things explained by natural sciences. But reasons are not the kind of thing that can be explained by natural sciences. Accordingly, the space of reasons is not reducible to the realm of law. And the fact that human life is a product of blind evolution concerns the realm of law. Therefore, this fact says nothing about whether our lives are good or bad. Let me elaborate on this point a bit further.
First, to say that our lives are bad is to make a negative normative evaluation of them. And we have no other rational way but to make such an evaluation on the basis of some relevant norms. One thing worth noting here is that the concept of bad contained in such a normative evaluation is our concept. This is why we can understand the claim that our lives are bad. And there must be the norms for governing the correct application of this concept. But the realm of law does not include any norm in it. Therefore, the concepts of good and bad make sense only within the logical space of reasons. Second, according to Kant, nature by itself doesn’t have any goal in it. Instead, we, as autonomous beings, can set our own goals. And our autonomy gives us inner worth and dignity, making us ends in ourselves with absolute worth.
As pointed out before, to say that our lives are bad is to make a normative evaluation, and we have no other rational way but to make such an evaluation on the basis of some relevant norms. And those norms are binding on all of us only if they are universal norms, which apply to all of us. On Kant’s view (1996), such universal norms are moral norms, and moral norms are the means for achieving the moral goal.
What then is the moral goal? The moral goal can be understood in both negative and positive ways. On Kant’s view, all rational beings are ends in themselves for which universal norms are set up. So we can understand each rational being as having the status of an end in themselves which constitutes the limits against which we must not act. Therefore, the moral goal can be understood negatively in terms of not doing anything that conflicts with one’s status of an end in themselves. And the moral goal understood in this negative way provides us with duties of right, which impose limiting conditions or restrictions on choice. For example, anyone should not harm another person for no reason.
The moral goal can also be understood in the positive way in terms of permissible ends, that is, ends that we are permitted to pursue within the limits of the duties of right. On Kant’s view, one permissible end is to promote our own perfection, and another permissible end is to promote the happiness of others. And the moral goal understood in this positive way provides us with duties of virtue. So one duty of virtue is to cultivate our own perfection.
On the Kantian view, it is reasonable for us to accept the moral goal, as every individual has intrinsic worth and should be treated as an end in themselves. This means refraining from actions that conflict with their status as an end. For instance, killing someone without reason is morally wrong as it can be negatively evaluated vis-à-vis the moral goal (understood in the negative way). In addition, treating someone as an end in themselves entails allowing them to pursue their permissible goals, as long as it doesn’t conflict with their duties of right. Denying someone the pursuit of their permissible ends would result in a significantly diminished quality of life for them. Consequently, this would not be in line with the moral goal (understood in the positive way). Therefore, in the Kantian perspective, acting in accordance with one’s duty of virtue is considered morally good.
In light of the above Kantian view, consider again whether the fact that human life is a product of blind evolution justifies that our lives are overall bad. To begin, the origin of human life through blind evolution has no direct bearing on the view that we are ends in ourselves and autonomous beings capable of setting goals. In addition, when evaluating whether our lives are bad, we have no other rational way but to make such a normative evaluation on the basis of some relevant norms. And those norms are binding on all of us only if they are universal norms. According to Kant, such universal norms are moral norms, which help achieve the moral goal, independent of our evolutionary origins. This means that the fact that humans evolved blindly is independent of whether our lives align with the moral goal. Therefore, the fact that human life is a product of blind evolution does not justify our lives as being overall bad.
Let us now turn to Benatar’s more important reason for our lack of cosmic meaning, namely, that our lives can hardly make a significant difference to the universe. On Kant’s view, we are ends in ourselves, and it is we who can set goals for ourselves. Therefore, whether something is good or bad ultimately depends on whether it contributes to the realization of what is really good for us as ends in ourselves. If this is correct, then we are all rationally required to adopt a goal only if it is not beyond our capacity to achieve it. The reason is straightforward. If a certain goal is beyond our capacity to achieve, then we would waste our precious life by pursuing the unrealizable goal. Therefore, we can refuse to adopt such an unrealizable goal on the grounds that it does not contribute to the realization of what is really good for us as ends in ourselves.
Now, with the above point in mind, consider again whether one can have a good life, even if they cannot make a significant difference to the universe. To address this question more specifically, let us consider a certain person whose life is flourishing on the individual level, although he cannot make a significant difference to the universe. Let us call him Albert. According to Benatar, our lives are akin to Sisyphus’s pointless life, endlessly repeating the futile task of rolling a rock uphill, only to witness it rolling back down. But there are important differences between Albert’s life and Sisyphus’s life. As pointed out before, there is no goal in the realm of law. Instead, it is we who can set goals for ourselves. On Kant’s view, we can do so, because we are autonomous beings, who have the capacity to do so. Therefore, Albert as an autonomous being can set his permissible ends for himself, and pursue them. Here recall two things. Whether something is good or bad ultimately depends on whether it contributes to the realization of what is really good for us as ends in ourselves. And Albert’s life is flourishing on the individual level. Therefore, we can evaluate his life as a good one. By contrast, Sisyphus cannot have such a good life. For he has been deprived by the gods of his freedom (or autonomy) to pursue his permissible ends. As a consequence, he does not even have a chance to have a good life. So we can explain why Sisyphus’s life is pointless. Unlike Albert, Sisyphus is deprived of the chance to lead a good life. This is why we can say that Sisyphus’s life is a condemned life.
One more thing to note is that making a significant difference to the universe is not a rational goal for Albert. As pointed out before, it is not rational for us to pursue a goal which is way beyond our capacity to achieve. And it is way beyond Albert’s capacity to make a significant difference to the universe. If, for this reason, making a significant difference to the universe is not a rational goal for Albert in the first place, then there is no good reason to think that the realization of what is really good for Albert depends on his making a significant difference to the universe.
For the above reasons, this paper argues that the fact that one cannot make a significant difference to the universe does not justify one’s life as being overall bad, either. In conclusion, if the arguments presented in this paper are correct, there is no need to be bewildered by Benatar’s pessimistic conclusion drawn from the alleged cosmic perspective.
References
Benatar, David (2006). Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Benatar, David (2017). The Human Predicament: A Candid Guide to Life’s Biggest
Questions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kant, Immanuel (1996). Practical Philosophy. Translated and edited by Mary Gregor.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sellars, Wilfrid (1963). Science, Perception, and Reality. Atascadero: Ridgeview.