Connor Kianpour (University of Colorado, Boulder), "Strong Comic Immoralism"

Forthcoming, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

By Connor Kianpour

Some of us drink our comedy dark. And those of us who do seem not to be able to get enough of it. There’s something special about dark comedy, the comedic genre known for its downright offensiveness and insensitivity. So special, in fact, that some of us think that the more twisted a joke is, the funnier it is likely to be. Well, at least one of us does. It’s me––I’m the one.

In my recent article, “Strong Comic Immoralism,” I defend a view that has long been shunned by the philosophy of humor. The philosophy of humor? Yes, it’s a thing. One of the questions philosophers of humor consider concerns what the relationship is between immorality in jokes and how funny they are. The comic moralists believe that immorality in jokes make them less funny––some of them think this holds true always, some of them think this holds true sometimes. The comic immoralists believe that immorality in jokes make them funnier. (And the comic pluralists think that immorality in jokes sometimes makes them less funny and sometimes makes them funnier.) Up until now, comic immoralists have only defended moderate comic immoralism, or the view that immorality in jokes sometimes makes them funnier. But I hold the view that immorality in jokes always makes them funnier––I defend strong comic immoralism.

I don’t offer a knockdown argument in defense of strong comic immoralism in my article. Give me some time and I’ll get there. But I do show how strong comic immoralism is a coherent position and that there is some reason to accept it is true. This is pretty significant, given that Noël Carroll once wrote that “Strong comic immoralism seems too strong, embraced by no one on this side of Satan.” I can safely report that it’s nice here on the other side of Satan. The jokes are good. And what’s more is I have some pretty good arguments that might convince you to join me here.

I’ll only give you a taste of the arguments I make in my article, but if your palette is pleased, I encourage you to enjoy the full course here.

Strong comic immoralism might strike you as something you simply could never get behind because so many people find a good number of immoral jokes to be less funny precisely because the jokes are immoral. But I think the strong comic immoralist has a way to compellingly respond to this concern. The people who find immoral jokes to be less funny because they are immoral are not in good positions to judge how funny immoral jokes are! You wouldn’t let someone averse to sweets judge a cake competition, would you? So why would you let someone averse to the immorality in jokes judge how funny immoral jokes are? We have very good reason to believe that offense and amusement are incompatible emotions; you cannot be at once both offended and amused by the same thing. So those who take offense to the immorality in a joke and judge it to be less funny on that basis have their capacity for amusement impaired, and shouldn’t be taken as authorities on how funny the joke in question is. We want those who judge how funny jokes are to be capable of being amused by them!

Shouldn’t be taken as authorities on how funny the joke in question is? How funny jokes are is subjective! This argument is stupid. You probably just had this thought or a thought similar to it. But I don’t think it’s as crazy as some people do to think that we could be mistaken about how funny jokes are. A long, long time ago, Adam Smith wrote that “We may often approve of a jest, and think the laughter of the company quite just and proper, though we ourselves do not laugh, because, perhaps, we are in a grave humour, or happen to have our attention engaged with other objects.” Even though Smith wrote this eons ago, I think it’s a pretty relatable sentiment. We can sometimes acknowledge in the moment that we don’t, for whatever reason, think a joke is as funny as it really is. Who’s to say that there aren’t times when we aren’t as self aware where we fail to see that a funny joke is funny?

Beyond this, it seems that people have no problem admitting that they are not competent to judge certain kinds of art. And no, I am not talking about when they are deflecting questions about the quality of their blind date’s SoundCloud music repertoire. I’m talking about things like when people will hear an orchestral piece that others claim is an artistic triumph, not like the piece, and think to themselves, “I probably just don’t have what it takes to really appreciate this.” So why should people have a problem admitting that they are not competent to judge how funny jokes are in some cases? Sure, they’re no Mona Lisa, but jokes are still works of art. (And you don’t have to go to Paris to enjoy them––you might even want to avoid Paris if you want to enjoy good jokes.)

It seems like strong comic immoralism is at least a coherent position. But there are lots of coherent positions that are bologna. (I won’t name names, but I’m sure you can think of some.) So how do we get from the claim that strong comic immoralism is coherent to the claim that it might be true?

I think when artists challenge the conventions that govern their art medium, they make their art better than it would have been if they didn’t challenge these conventions. Poets who mess with rhyme scheme, guitarists who use their guitars not just for strumming but to lay down a sick beat, modern artists who present us with nothing but a toilet in an art exhibit and have us marvel at its glory––these artists all challenge the conventions that govern their art mediums. And it strikes me as reasonable to say that whatever it is that makes these artists’ art good is in part constituted by how they challenged the conventions governing their preferred artform.

The same goes for joke-telling. When a joke-teller challenges the conventions governing the art of comedy, part of what makes these jokes funny is how they challenge the conventions of comedy. The conventions governing comedy are what I call “shared social understandings,” which include things like our understandings of what’s rude and what’s polite, as well as our understandings of what’s right and what’s wrong. It’s pretty clear to me that immoral jokes challenge our understandings of what’s rude and what’s polite, what’s right and what’s wrong. If they didn’t, there wouldn’t be all of this fuss about comedians like Dave Chappelle. So if challenging the conventions of an artform make the resultant artworks better, and immoral joke-telling challenges the conventions of comedy, then immoral jokes have something that makes them good as jokes that “clean” jokes do not. Thus, strong comic immoralism could very well be true, provided that I’m right that challenging the conventions of an artform make the resultant artworks better.

On top of that, the truth of strong comic immoralism fits well with other things we know about human psychology. Take the forbidden fruit hypothesis, for instance. I think we are all familiar with the ways in which humans have a tendency to pursue that which they take to be off-limits to them. (The always-chipper Edgar Allan Poe even wrote a short story about this tendency!) And if immoral jokes have allure because they’re enshrouded in taboo, the strong comic immoralist gives us an explanation for why these jokes have the allure they do: because their immorality makes them funnier.

Before wrapping up, I think it’s important to clear up some ways that my arguments could be misinterpreted. I’m not saying that every immoral joke is going to be funnier than every “clean” joke. Lord knows this isn’t true. Even with my penchant for dastardly humor, I can recognize that some people tell twisted jokes that simply do not land and that some people tell innocuous jokes that bring the house down. Rather, I’m saying that every immoral joke has something that makes it funnier than if the joke wasn’t immoral.

I’m also not saying that every immoral joke is ok to tell or enjoy, morally speaking. (At least, not yet; again, give me some time and I’ll get there.) Strong comic immoralism just tells us things about how funny jokes are in light of how immoral they are. It doesn’t tell us things about whether it’s ok for us to tell or enjoy immoral jokes. So you can still subscribe to my view even if you think that people should deprive the world of comedic excellence by biting their tongues when they want to make that naughty joke. (I obviously say this with my tongue squarely in my cheek, but if you giggled, it’s worth pointing out that some people think things can be funnier because they are true…) It might even be that subscribing to my view helps us explain why immoral jokes are wrong to tell. As Ted Cohen once said, “if there is a problem with such jokes, the problem is compounded exactly by the fact that they are funny. Face that fact. And then let us talk about it.”

There’s obviously a lot more to say about strong comic immoralism. Thankfully, I have said a lot more about it in my article recently published in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. You should give it a look if you’re interested. And if you’re interested in keeping up with some of my other work, both humor-related and not, be sure to check out my professional website: www.connorkianpour.com.