Daniel E. Kalpokas (National University of Córdoba), "Perception and Its Content: Toward the Propositional Attitude View"
Rowman & Littlefield, 2024
What is perceptual experience? Does it have content? If it does, what kind of content is it? Is that content conceptual or non-conceptual? Is it propositional or non-propositional? How does perception justify empirical judgments and beliefs?
This book addresses these questions by considering crucial debates in epistemology and philosophy of mind from the last few decades. The book’s general structure is as follows. First, it raises the question of whether experience has content. Here, two theories that deny that perceptual experience has content are critically examined: the causal-linkage theory and naïve realism (Chapters 1 and 2). The general criticism of these theories is that they fail to explain the epistemic significance of experience and its phenomenal character. A preliminary conclusion is that we must attribute content to experience.
Second, the book raises the question of what kind of content perceptual experience possesses. As a first approximation, it considers whether perceptual content is conceptual or non-conceptual (Chapter 3). By discussing different varieties of non-conceptualism (Heck’s, Peacocke’s, and Hanna’s), it concludes that, to the extent that experience has epistemic relevance (i.e., it can serve as a reason to justify a belief or judgment), perceptual content is, at least partially, conceptual (or necessarily involves concepts). The overall argument supporting this conclusion is that non-conceptualism falls into the Myth of the Given (Sellars).
Third, the question of whether experience has propositional or non-propositional content is explored (Chapter 4). This chapter argues that perceptual content is propositional. Three arguments support this thesis: a) When we express or describe experiences (or what we perceive), we are inevitably compelled to use complete sentences (expressions like “as,” “as of,” “as if,” and “as though” are shown to be alternative forms of expressing propositional content). b) We never perceive mere objects, i.e., as if they were not bearers of properties or did not have relations with other objects. We always perceive that things are thus and so. For example, we perceive that a book is on the table, that a tomato is red, that the coffee is cold, etc. If we define phenomenology as the way things appear in experience, we can claim that perceptual phenomenology has a propositional structure. c) Only if experience has propositional content can it be a reason for a belief or judgment, since only a proposition can be a premise in inference or justify a belief in a non-inferential transition of the form “p, then p.”
Fourth, the book tackles the question of whether perceptual content is world-dependent or not, arguing that it is world-dependent (Chapter 5). The rationale for this thesis is that if the perceived objects do not somehow comprise the content of experience, this content falls short of the world. In other words, if objects and properties are not a constitutive part of perceptual content, it cannot be explained how we are immediately conscious of the world during perception. Let me further elaborate on this idea, as it is a crucial step in the book’s argument.
The point of departure is the perspectival character of perception. We always perceive objects from a certain point of view, at some distance, and in different environmental conditions. This feature of perceptual experience comes together with another one, i.e., its piecemeal nature. In gazing at a book, for example, we only see (in a sense) its cover, but not its backside. By touching my wallet, I can only sense some part of it, not the whole wallet. And when I listen to music, I hear each part successively. In sum, we never perceive the complete objects or events at the same time, instantaneously.
Notwithstanding this, even when we only perceive a part or aspect of objects, it seems, phenomenally speaking, that we see whole objects. This occurs because, as argued, when perceiving some part of an object, we a-modally represent its rear sides. In a plausible account, this happens when our concepts and background knowledge about objects influence experience. Therefore, if you have the notion or concept of a book and know how books typically look, you can a-modally represent the book’s backside. Thus, when you look at the book’s cover, it appears to be a complete book.
We now have the necessary elements to account for the content of perception. The content of experience is said to consist of how things seem to us. How things appear to us depends, on the one hand, on the parts or aspects of the objects that, given a particular point of view, reach our senses and, on the other hand, the concepts under which those objects fall when perceiving them. Thus, the objects, such as they appear from a certain point of view, provide a component of perceptual content. The other component is the concepts that penetrate experience and under which we experience objects. The first component anchors experience to the world; the second makes the perceived item intelligible. For example, when I notice a book on the table, I see its cover. The cover itself, as it appears to me, given my current viewpoint, is an element of the content of my experience. By seeing it as falling under the extension of the concept of a book, I can not only a-modally represent its backside so that it looks like a whole book but also recognize it as a book.
We can draw two (at least) crucial consequences from this. First, since the perceived objects, as they appear in experience, are constituent components of perceptual content, perception can provide an undefeatable warrant or justification for the related beliefs and judgments. The epistemic authority of perception lies in the fact that it discloses things just as they are. When one comes to believe that p because one perceives that p, one is in epistemic touch with the truth-maker of one’s belief. No further questions about the credentials of one’s belief can arise. Second, since objects, as they appear from a given point of view, comprise, along with the relevant concepts, the content of perceptual experience, the mind is in immediate touch with the world. There is no bridge to save between the mind and the world. The world is somehow in the mind (the perceived piece of the world is a constitutive element of perceptual content), and the mind is somehow in the world (it conceptually categorizes the perceived things).
The book concludes by clarifying the nature of perceptual reasons and how the empirical content of thought is possible. To begin with, let us consider perceptual reasons. In perception, we are not just presented with objects and their properties; furthermore, we take appearances as facts. We do this by implicitly assuming the propositional content of experience to be true. Since perceptual content is partly conceptual, experiences can have logical relationships with beliefs and judgments and, thus, rationally justify them. Since perceptual content is partly composed of the perceived objects and properties, as they appear from a given point of view, perceptual reasons can be anchored in the world. Finally, since perceiving is the attitude of taking appearances as facts, it can be explained why we can be motivated by perceptual reasons.
To close, I consider the empirical content of thought in the book. Empirical thought is thought vulnerable to the dictates of the empirical world. Experience, when veridical, is supposed to be revelatory of the world. Thus, if thought is to be about the world, it must be verifiable through perception. Perceptual verifiability is a condition of the possibility of empirical thinking. If experience did not help us decide whether or not a thought is true, we could not understand what state of affairs the thought stands for. But then, we could not take such a thought to refer to the world. Furthermore, using and understanding empirical words, like “black” or “cat,” presuppose the perceptual capacity to recognize their referents. We do this by perceiving the referents of such words as falling under the extension of the relevant concepts. That capacity is a condition to know what we mean by employing empirical terms. Arguably, lacking such a capacity disqualifies one as a competent speaker. This is so because we initially learn our first words (and other representations) by linking them to their referents. To this, perception must reveal, immediately, those referents.
To sum up, if thought and language are to be adequately linked to the world, perception must be immediate sensory awareness of physical objects and properties. As I argue in the book, we can only attain this if we include objects and properties (in the already specified way) in the content of perception. Thus, the recommended conception of perceptual content also sheds light on how thinking and language can refer to reality.
