Kal Kalewold (University of Leeds), "Lockdowns and the ethics of intergenerational compensation"

Forthcoming - Politics, Philosophy and Economics

The elderly owe the young compensation for the harms of lockdown

By Kal Kalewold

When the severity of the Covid pandemic became apparent in the early spring of 2020, there was widespread support for anti-contagion policies— such as stay at home orders, school closures, social distancing, among others— across societies around the world. The combination of these policies came to be known as lockdowns. Nonetheless, most people willingly took precautions to protect themselves and their loved ones; often before, and occasionally despite the absence of, lockdown policies.

It is also around this time that the nature of the Covid virus became better known. Simply put, the older one was, the higher the risk of severe illness and death from Covid. According to CDC data released in 2022, more than half of all deaths from Covid in the United States have been of people over the age of 75. Nearly 75% of all deaths were recorded in those over age 65. Data from other countries around the world bear similar results. In sharp contrast to the Spanish influenza pandemic of 1918, the young and children were largely spared from severe illness and death.

I believe lockdowns were a morally and medically appropriate response to Covid. Lockdowns saved lives (according to one estimate, perhaps as much as 3.5 million lives were saved in Europe by May 2020). Nevertheless, lockdowns imposed severe costs on society.

More specifically, lockdowns disproportionately imposed costs upon the young. Think about what common lockdown policies entail. School closures result in the disruption of children’s education and its replacement by worse alternatives. The parents of these children, who are themselves young, must now bear additional care responsibilities. Disruption to leisure, hospitality, retail, and other sectors most directly impacted by lockdowns harm workers who tend to be much younger than the workforce as a whole. Graduations, weddings, university lectures, and other social events were postponed, canceled, or held virtually.

Of course, it would be absurd to say the elderly did not suffer due to lockdowns. Social isolation and disruption of life also acutely affected the elderly. But crucially, the elderly bore this cost and the epidemiological benefit. In a world in which the severity of Covid for those over 65 was the same as for those under 45, we almost certainly would not have imposed lockdowns. Furthermore, it would not have been justifiable to do so. The reason Covid nearly broke the healthcare systems of even advanced economies and sickened and killed millions is because of the serious health risk it posed to the elderly. And it is this risk that justified lockdowns.

The argument I make in this paper is that the robust debate both in philosophy and in the wider public about the permissibility of lockdowns and alternative anti-contagion measures should not be the end of the moral and political evaluation of our collective response to Covid. The aftermath of Covid and lockdowns deserves equal attention. I argue that even if lockdowns were permissible, there is still a moral remainder. Namely, the elderly have a duty to compensate the young for the harms they bore due to lockdown. Lockdowns policies constituted a shock to the life plans of the young. The disruptions mentioned above— to education, work, social life— strike at the heart of the youngs’ ability to realize fundamental life plans.

The burden shifting constituted by lockdowns are not like other cases of policies that transfer benefits between age groups, such as pensions or health insurance. Unlike other cases of preferential treatment for the elderly, such as the high share of health care spending for older age groups, the benefits of lockdown are not something the young can age into. Lockdowns were a policy response to a pandemic emergency with characteristics that are highly unlikely to repeat.

I think we should respond to the aftermath of Covid in the same way the United States treated returning troops after the Second World War. Although the US was justified in conscripting millions to fight the Axis Powers, it nonetheless compensated them for the disproportionate costs they bore in the fight. The GI Bill was a foundation for the prosperity of returning soldiers, providing free or subsidized education, housing, job opportunities, and much more.

We can and should embark on a similar policy today. The specifics are not as important as what they should aim for: enhancing the long-term prospects of the young by providing them with free or subsidized education, renewable energy, infrastructure, jobs, and the like. This could be achieved with policies along the same lines as the GI Bill. To make this transfer intergenerational, it should be financed by means of a wealth tax. Given that the largest share of wealth in countries like the US and UK is held by the elderly, a wealth tax would disproportionately draw from the elderly (rich). This constitutes a progressive and just intergenerational transfer that at least begins to compensate the young for the burdens they bore. The solidarity the young showed the elderly through the Covid years must in turn engender solidarity for the young as the fiscal and social settlement of the post-Covid world takes shape.