Kurt Blankschaen (Daemen College) & Travis Timmerman (Seton Hall University), "Acting Out: Straight Performers Permissibly Portraying Queer Characters"

Forthcoming, Journal of Moral Philosophy

Kurt Blankschaen (L) & Travis Timmerman (R)

By Kurt Blankschaen & Travis Timmerman

In 2022, Kit Connor played a bisexual character in Netflix’s queer coming of age story, Heartstopper. When Connor was later cast in a straight romantic comedy, fans began speculating about whether he was “taking” a bisexual role away from a bisexual performer. Fans eventually badgered Connor on social media so much that he came out on X, writing “Back for a bit. I’m bi. Congrats on forcing an 18-year-old to out himself. I think some of you missed the point of the show. Bye.” Other performers playing characters with a marginalized sexuality found themselves confronting the same kinds of questions from fans. While many fans may be acting on the laudable goal of increasing representation among a marginalized community, we argue that demanding that performers disclose their sexual orientation is morally counterproductive.

This gatekeeping social pressure typically leaves only three options for performers, and none of them are good. It will force performers to either

(i) out themselves against their will

(ii) subject themselves to intense public backlash by taking the role without outing themselves

(iii) forgo taking a role they want and would excel at.

Given how (comparably) bad each of these options are, people should stop creating this social pressure, or so we argue. Additionally, we argue that performers often have an (epistemic) obligation to learn about what their characters’ corresponding real-world experiences would plausibly be like. But that doesn’t mean that performers are only morally permitted to take roles that correspond to their own social identity and, we cannot stress this enough, it definitely doesn’t mean that fans can harass performers on social media to try and ensure there is this match.

Let’s start with philosophers’ favorite move of drawing a key distinction for our argument. (We promise to only do this once in this blog post. But see our full paper for even more bold and exciting distinctions.) We distinguish between what we call character authenticity and performer authenticity. Whenever a character accurately represents what their real-world counterparts’ lived experiences would plausibly be like, there is character authenticity. Whenever a performer’s social identity matches their character’s social identity, there is performer authenticity.

Character authenticity matters for marginalized groups, in part, because the public often relies on cinematic or dramatic representations to learn about the group in question. Yet, there is an embarrassing history of characters with a marginalized sexuality being depicted as loners, tragic figures, criminals, sexual predators, or perverts. Moreover, since there weren’t many cinematic counterexamples or positive political role models, some of the public concluded that actual gays, lesbians, and bisexuals were security risks infiltrating the government or prowling around schools or the park to molest children. It wasn’t really until the late 1990s and early 2000s where people regularly saw main characters in TV shows (Will & Grace, Dawson’s Creek) and films (Brokeback Mountain, Milk) that portrayed sympathetic and three-dimensional gay characters. These positive media representations were sometimes flawed, but they did soften public attitudes towards homosexuality. Notice, however, that these shifts happened because the characters were more like real world counterparts that audiences could work with, live next door to, or welcome to family events. Many of the performers who played these characters did not have a marginalized sexual orientation.

At this point, you might be saying to yourself “Okay, how much longer is this blog post?” The answer is that you’re between a third and halfway done. Keep reading! You might also be asking yourself whether this matters much given that the political landscape has changed for the better. You may be contemplatively furrowing your brow and saying out loud to no one in particular “Why not think that asking for performer authenticity is just the next step in making sure lesbian, gay, and bisexual performers get to represent themselves in shows or movies?” Good question! Our answer is that this outlook, while well intended, actually leads to the trilemma mentioned above.

We’ll now dig deeper into each of the three options and explain why we think they end up hurting vulnerable performers. Consider the first option, where a performer comes out before they are ready, as Connor did. This seems obviously bad. One’s sexuality is a deeply personal part of someone’s identity and coercing them into announcing their sexual orientation (especially if marginalized) in the public square takes away what should be a fully autonomous choice. Those who put the pressure on the performer to out themselves may quickly forget about their announcements and move on with their day. The emotional scarring inflicted on the performer, though, doesn’t go away so quickly, as nearly every performer confirms when they talk about forced disclosure.

Another worry is that pressuring performers to out themselves may expose them to backlash from bigoted sections of the public. Many have received death threats for playing such characters, even in the 2020s. The bigoted backlash needn’t come from strangers either. Michael Cimino (straight) played Victor Salazar (gay) and was ostracized by homophobic friends and family. There is also the very real risk to one's career prospects since casting directors, producers, and the studio system may pass over performers who are seen as “risky” or “controversial” for audiences in a way that will hurt their bottom line.

What about the second option? Why couldn’t a performer just take the role without coming out? Well, as we saw with Connor, it’s likely just a matter of time before the performer faces questions and demands to either come out (option one) or step down from the role. If they are able to stay in the role, and choose to do so, they may be relentlessly hounded about their sexual orientation. The production may lose much of its audience as a result (e.g. because the production company spends less money advertising; because fewer people are willing to watch it). This outcome could be avoided, of course, if the performer doesn’t keep the role. They could happen because they are forced to leave or because they voluntarily step down. Either way, they miss out on a role they wanted and, since they were cast, likely would have excelled at.

Is this so bad if it results in, say, a straight performer being replaced by a gay performer? Yes. While that may be a short-term “win,” we provide a variety of reasons in the paper to think that it is a setback overall. One, somewhat counter intuitive, consideration is that this would implicitly out performers by generating the perception that anyone who plays a lesbian, gay, or bisexual character has performer authenticity. This can serve as a deterrent for closeted aspiring performers from pursuing an acting career in the first place. It may also reinforce the wholly unjustified assumption that straight characters are best portrayed by straight performers, and so (in the name of performer authenticity) box such marginalized performers out of certain roles and typecast them into others.

Finally, consider the third option. Performers with a marginalized sexual orientation just forgo taking the role in the first place. While a slightly different option, similar problems arise. This too would at least implicitly out performers who play characters with marginalized sexual orientations. It would prevent certain performers from getting career boosting roles that, by hypothesis, they would be most suited to play. In the paper, we argue that it would also, quite surprisingly, result in significantly fewer lesbian, gay, and bisexual performers playing lesbian, gay, or bisexual characters, which goes against the whole motivation of wanting performer authenticity in the first place. To see that argument, you’ll have read the paper though, which you can do here and for free! What a steal.

Okay, that's the bare bones of our positive argument. At this point, you may agree and be saying to yourself "What a brilliant argument! This will change the world." If so, thank you so much and no need to read further. Alternatively, you might agree with us about the downsides of these options, but think that’s just the high cost of doing the “right thing.” Maybe the alternative is even worse and what we should do, after all, depends on the comparative goodness of the options. Being the perceptive and professional ethicists we are, we anticipated this response. In the paper, we go on to look at four different considerations that support performer authenticity. If you haven't seen the previous links, you can read the paper right here. But so as not to bury the lede, these are the four arguments we consider.

(1) Performer authenticity best ensures character authenticity because of performers’ lived experiences.

(2) Performer authenticity lets marginalized communities tell their stories on their own terms.

(3) Performer authenticity creates role models for fans and younger or aspiring performers.

(4) Demanding performer authenticity prevents non-marginalized performers from “taking away” roles from marginalized performers.

In each case, we argue that these considerations do not support prioritizing performer authenticity over character authenticity. In fact, the motivation underlying a few considerations actually tell against working towards performer authenticity and count solely in favor of ensuring character authenticity. They do, we argue, collectively make a good case for the epistemic obligation mentioned at the outset. You may now be glaring incredulously at the monitor. But if you don’t believe us, just download the paper and read it here or HERE! It’s free, so you get to pay what it's worth.

We’ve reached the end of the blog post. Being the perceptive and professional philosophers you are, you may have objections. We’ve got good news! We end the paper by considering and rebutting three objections. We’re sure that our responses will be to everyone’s satisfaction, resulting in universal agreement, as is so common in philosophy. You can see those objections and our responses in the full paper. Did we mention you can do it for free? Did we mention you can download it and send it to ten friends and curse them if they don’t then send it to ten more friends and so on forever?

But on the off chance you’re not completely convinced by our arguments, and want to tell us why, please do so. You can reach us by email at kblanksc@daemen.edu and travis.timmerman@shu.edu. If you want to go one step further and write a reply, please do so. But if you want to write a devastating reply, please consider how valuable your time is and all the other more important projects you could pursue instead.