Malte Hendrickx (University of Michigan), "Agentially controlled action: causal, not counterfactual"

Philosophical Studies, 2023

By Malte Hendrickx

What's the difference between what we do, such as eating or running, and what merely happens to us, such as being startled or blinking? This "Problem of Action" has divided philosophers of action into different camps, depending on whether they favor a "causal" explanation, a "counterfactual" explanation, or a third option.

Frankfurt gave the first fully developed counterfactual explanation. He argues that movements are agentially controlled action iff the agent could intervene in the movement as it unfolds. For example, if you're in a car coasting downhill, you are still considered in control of your driving downhill even if you don't hit the gas or brakes, in virtue of being able to do so if you want to. This holds even if you do not choose to intervene, according to Frankfurt. But when you could not intervene, such as when comatose, you would not be considered to be the one driving downhill: you would no longer be performing an agentially controlled action. This counterfactual analysis quickly grew popular with philosophers of action, many of whom were skeptical about the alternative causal approaches. 

Now, before I present my argument, take a deep breath. No, really. Inhale air for 5 seconds. Do it now! Don't read on before you do it.

Note how you, just now, intervened in your breathing pattern. Usually, your passive breathing is regulated by your body. It is something that merely happens to you, and not considered agentially controlled action. But at any time, you can act to intervene if you want to - as you just did. Many mere behaviours allow for such active intervention: think of swallowing, blinking, or posture maintenance. If Frankfurt were right, this possibility of intervention would make your passive breathing, swallowing, blinking etc. an agentially controlled action, even when you do not choose to intervene. But that's the wrong verdict. Passive breathing, swallowing, blinking etc. are paradigm examples of mere behaviour. It is only the intervention itself that is agentially controlled action, not every passive breath/swallow/blink in which you could intervene. So Frankfurt's view is wrong.

That's the heart of the paper. I spent some more pages answering all possible responses I could think of and defended an empirically informed causal alternative. You can check if I thought of your favorite solution here.