Manuel Almagro & Sergio Guerra (University of Granada), "There's a certain slant of light: Three attitudes toward the political turn in analytic philosophy"

Metaphilosophy, 2023

By Manuel Almagro and Sergio Guerra

Sasa, an analytic philosopher, was attending one of those big conferences at the intersection of philosophy and politics, where famous and up-and-coming philosophers deliver their talks in simultaneous sessions spread across several fancy rooms. Sasa didn’t know many people at the conference, nor their general views on many political topics. But Sasa could take a guess. People in these conferences are typically left-leaning and tend to show concern for social wrong in general. “They’re probably all about injustice, so there’s a shot they’ll dig my talk”, Sasa thought.

The talks kicked off. Many of them, even with their subtle differences, seemed to have this shared assumption about the current political situation: “Folks out there don’t think much, and when they do, it’s usually a mess, and that’s why everything’s going downhill.” And there was this underlying assumption about the philosophers’ role: “We gotta enlighten the citizens, teach them how to think critically.” This idea, permeating every nook and cranny of the luxurious conference venue, made Sasa feel uneasy. “Wait, are we even on the same page when it comes to the injustice we care about?,” wondered Sasa.

It was finally Sasa’s turn. Sasa spoke about one of the possible mechanisms used to manipulate and divide perfectly rational people. To Sasa’s relief (or dismay), the talk went smoothly. Several individuals expressed their interest and enthusiasm, and approached Sasa to continue the discussion after the talk. Befe, another analytic philosopher, chimed in, “Fantastic talk! I’m eager to delve deeper into this mechanism. I strongly suspect it’s at play in the culture wars I’m engaged in. The other side seems to be using it to advance their agenda.” The conversation carried on, but as time passed, Sasa grew increasingly uneasy, even more so than before. It suddenly dawned on Sasa that Befe belonged to the very side that Sasa held responsible for perpetuating the injustice. “Sure, they showed interest in my talk. But do they genuinely care about injustice?,” Sasa pondered.

There’s nothing unusual about meeting people with different political views and values at philosophy conferences. However, Sasa’s story raises some philosophically interesting questions for what’s going on in analytic philosophy nowadays.

In recent times, there has been a noticeable surge of interest in social and political issues within the analytic tradition. This not only entails that analytic philosophers are engaging with political matters such as gender, polarization, and epistemic injustice, but also that they are examining traditional philosophical problems and positions through a political lens. For instance, Jessica Keiser’s recent book, Non-ideal Foundations of Language (2023), challenges the conventional conception of language as a cooperative exchange of information by highlighting its unjustified and detrimental idealization. Keiser argues that this idealization is the result of not considering the experiences of oppressed individuals, and therefore misrepresents the subject under study. Another notable example is Amia Srinivasan’s critique of epistemic internalism, which posits that epistemic justification is exclusively dependent on reasons accessible from the knower’s perspective. As Srinivasan points out, epistemic internalism may play a role in perpetuating oppression, because relevant facts about oppression are frequently not accessible to agents (even oppressed ones) due to ideological devices, implying that there is no possible knowledge about them.

Recently, David Bordonaba Plou, Victor Fernández Castro, and José Ramón Torices have offered a characterization of this tendency in analytic philosophy, exemplified by Keiser’s and Srinivasan’s approaches, which has been labeled “The political turn in analytic philosophy”. According to their analysis, the political turn represents a form of philosophical activism, where analytic tools are employed to both combat and gain a deeper understanding of specific instances of injustice. An important consequence of this philosophical shift is that the effectiveness of competing theories in addressing situations of injustice becomes a criterion for evaluating and selecting among them.

But who exactly are the analytic philosophers who fall under the umbrella of this political turn? Let’s turn back to Sasa’s story. Are the analytic philosophers attending the conference, who assume that the central problem of our time is citizens’ epistemic deficiency, part of this political turn? After all, they employ tools from analytic philosophy to address situations they perceive as unjust. Why wouldn’t they be part of this political turn then? Is Sasa part of it too, or is it Befe? Perhaps both? Why? The dilemma arises from the fact that while they all are analytic philosophers concerned about perceived injustice, they hold contrasting views on what should be classified as unjust. So how to adjudicate?

In our paper, we tackle this question. Should philosophical works that focus on matters we do not acknowledge as unjust be included in the political turn? How should we approach this dilemma? To shed light on this issue, we explore the advantages and disadvantages of three distinct attitudes toward it: the neutral, inflexible, and revisionist attitudes. The neutral attitude takes a purely descriptive approach to defining the political turn, divorcing it from any particular set of values. According to this perspective, the phenomenon is merely distinguished based on whether philosophical works align with certain criteria, without making value judgments about which inquiries should or should not be considered part of the turn. The inflexible attitude argues for a fixed set of values that must be associated with the political turn. Under this stance, any investigation that does not align with these predetermined values would be excluded from the political turn. Finally, the revisionist attitude recognizes that our perceptions of injustice and oppressive practices are shaped by a specific set of values, yet it acknowledges the potential for error in identifying specific instances of injustice and the values associated with such perceptions. This perspective is closely related to Srinivasan’s idea of genealogical anxiety, which highlights that our beliefs and values are significantly shaped by contingent factors like culture and material conditions in which we are raised.

Building upon the analysis provided by Manuel de Pinedo and Neftalí Villanueva in their examination of the political turn, we advocate for embracing a revisionist attitude toward the political turn, particularly in public settings. We contend that the revisionist attitude combines the merits of both the neutral and inflexible stances while avoiding their respective drawbacks. In fact, we go as far as to assert that the revisionist attitude is the only attitude truly compatible with the political turn.

Another point we make in our paper is that the philosophical tradition has largely neglected to reflect upon and acknowledge the specific standpoint from which theorizing has been conducted, which can be identified as an oppressive practice. While it is true that many inquiries in analytic philosophy cannot be directly accused of being idealizations, this is often due to mere chance rather than a conscious effort. From our perspective, a crucial aspect of the political turn in analytic philosophy is the commitment to scrutinize the underlying assumptions that shape our perspective when engaging in theoretical work. The aim is to challenge idealized viewpoints that can distort the object of study and contribute to oppressive practices. By critically examining these background assumptions, we strive to foster a more nuanced and accurate understanding of the subjects we investigate, thus promoting a more inclusive and socially responsible approach within the discipline.

As we see it, Sasa and Befe mustn’t be neutral, but they might be wrong in their perceptions of injustice after all, since their perspectives are highly dependent on their previous experiences and their social positioning, so they need to engage with each other, under certain conditions, to being able to differentiate between what is unjust and what they just perceive as unjust. Sasa, Befe, and you, should be revisionist in many instances of public intervention. Or that’s what we claim. Are you curious about the details? Then read our paper! Don’t you agree with us? Better! Read our paper and let us know your thoughts, we are eager to revisit ours!