Vishnu Sridharan (UCLA), "Moral Thresholds and Aggregate Impact"
Vishnu Sridharan (UCLA), "Moral Thresholds and Aggregate Impact"
Forthcoming, The Journal of Philosophy
The Moral Imperative to End a Disproportionate War
When I wrote “Moral Thresholds and Aggregate Impact”, forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy, I did not set out to make a statement about current events. Like all my favorite projects, the paper grew out of a desire to contribute to a topic that, while fascinating, seemed importantly unresolved. By the time the paper was accepted for publication, however, it was impossible to consider its thesis without also considering its implications for Israel’s military incursion in Gaza in response to Hamas’ attack on October 7th. While the world may change again by the time the article is published—and I truly I hope it will—at this moment I can’t avoid thinking about what agreement on this issue would entail for Israel’s stated plan to invade Rafah, where approximately 1.5 million Palestinians are currently sheltered.
My hope in this short piece is to outline the contours of the debate my paper engages with and gesture at why the humanitarian crisis in Gaza seems to cut in favor of my view. I do not, however, discuss in granular detail the argument put forward in the paper—that reward awaits those who read the full piece!
The initial question I set out to answer was the following: can the permissibility of an action performed in pursuit of a goal depend on the outcome of prior actions performed in pursuit of that goal? While this question has primary been explored with respect to the proportionality of war, the question clearly has broader implications. As Seth Lazar writes:
Questions of proportionality [arise] in risky rescue attempts, emergency medicine or the management of bushfires. And the problem arises in more mundane scenarios too—environmental regulation and public health policy, for example, even taxation. In all these areas, you want to achieve some moral goal, doing so is ‘worth’ a particular degree of moral cost and no more.[1]
Some answer my research question in the negative, adopting what I call a “Prospective View.” According to the Prospective View, the permissibility of actions performed in pursuit of a goal does not depend on the outcome of prior actions performed in pursuit of that goal. In my paper, I end up endorsing what I call an “Aggregative View,” according to which the permissibility of an action performed in pursuit of a goal can depend on the outcome of past actions performed in pursuit of that same goal.
Before examining how these views differ in the context of war—which will likely be the most contentious—let’s see how they might apply in other contexts often thought to involve considerations of proportionality. We can start with an example that illustrates the appeal of the Aggregative View. Consider:
TIME SERVED: Allen is sentenced to two weeks in jail for sleeping in a public park without a permit. Two weeks is the maximum sentence for his crime that is proportionate to the (just) goal of general deterrence. Two weeks later, as Allen is about to be released from jail, the state realizes two things: 1) it has completely failed to achieve its goal of general deterrence, and 2) if it keeps Allen in jail for just one more week, it will achieve its goal.
I have no doubt that it would be impermissible for the state to keep Allen in jail for an additional week. This is because anything beyond a two-week jail term for Allen’s crime would be disproportionate to the goal of general deterrence, and if the state keeps him an additional week, he will have been held in jail for three weeks. The Aggregative View naturally captures this verdict because, according to the Aggregative View, the permissibility of the state keeping Allen in jail an additional week can depend on what the state has already done—namely, the two week jail term—in pursuit of its goal.
If we adopt a Prospective View, it is much harder for us to generate this judgment. This is because, when it comes to questions of proportionality, the Prospective View denies that the outcome of past actions in pursuit of a goal is relevant to the permissibility of subsequent actions in pursuit of that goal. As applied to TIME SERVED, this would mean that the state could keep Allen another week because being jailed for one week for sleeping in a public park is, by stipulation, proportionate to the goal of general deterrence.
To be clear, if we adopt the Prospective View, we will still have some moral criticism of the state in TIME SERVED. However, this criticism will not depend on whether the state holds Allen an additional week. Instead, the criticism will be leveled against the state for holding Allen for two weeks and accomplishing nothing. While the proponent of the Prospective View will in this way hold the state accountable for its (objectively) frivolous two-week punishment, it will not hold consider this past wrong relevant to the permissibility of jailing Allen for an additional week.
When thinking about TIME SERVED, we have two basic options: we either 1) limit the total time that Allen can be kept in jail in order to achieve the goal of general deterrence or 2) we allow the state to continue to pursue its just goals at some particular time as long as, from that time forward, it expects the costs that it imposes to be proportionate to the benefits reaped. I’m certainly tempted by 1), which is why I prefer the Aggregative View, but the case for 2) is plausible enough. In particular, the defender of the Prospective View might point out, do we really want to be saddled with a view that would not allow the state to keep Allen in jail for just 1 more day even if, by doing so, the state could accomplish the just goal of deterring others from sleeping in the park?
While a case like TIME SERVED seems to cut in favor of the Aggregative View, others may lend themselves to the Prospective View. Consider:
VAX TAX: A country can (justly) collect a maximum of 2% in annual taxes to develop a vaccine for the newest COVID variant. After spending this 2% tax in its entirety, the country realizes two things: 1) it cannot develop the vaccine with the money it has collected, and 2) it can develop the vaccine with an additional tax of .25%. If the new vaccine is developed, it is expected to save one million lives.
For me, the verdict that it would be impermissible for the country to collect an additional .25% in annual taxes is as strong as the verdict that it is impermissible for the state to jail Allen for an additional week. I explain this judgment by pointing to the fact that, as stipulated, the maximum annual tax that is proportional to the goal of developing a new vaccine is 2%, and if the country imposes an additional tax, that will result in a total annual tax of 2.25%. Again, this judgment is best captured by the Aggregative View.
If we adopt a Prospective View, on the other hand, it may be permissible for the country to collect the additional .25% tax. This is because, according to the Prospective View, the prior 2% tax imposed by the state is not relevant to the permissibility of collecting the additional tax. That is, while the state may have done something objectively wrong in collecting a 2% annual tax and failing to develop a vaccine, the permissibility of collecting additional taxes simply depends on whether the amount of the tax is proportionate to the goal that will be achieved. Since, by stipulation, a .25% annual tax is proportionate to the goal of developing a new vaccine, collecting this tax may be allowed. After all, the proponent of the Prospective View can point out, surely a .25% annual tax is worth it in order to save an expected one million lives?
On this point, the proponent of the Aggregative View would respond as follows: “Saving an expected one million lives is worth a .25% annual tax. In fact, it is worth a 2% annual tax! What saving an expected one million lives is not worth, however, is a 2.25% annual tax, which is what is being proposed in VAX TAX.”
In both TIME SERVED and VAX TAX, I think that the outcome of prior actions in pursuit of a goal is relevant to the permissibility of subsequent actions performed in pursuit of that same goal. In TIME SERVED, I think the state is limited in how long it can keep Allen in jail to deter others from sleeping in the park (a limit of 2 weeks, to be exact), and in VAX TAX, I think the country is limited in the amount of annual taxes it can collect to develop a new vaccine (a limit of 2%, to be exact).
While intuitions may differ in the above cases, Israel’s military incursion in Gaza may sway some toward the Aggregative View. In order for the difference between the two views to be clearest, I’ll make the following four assumptions:
1) In response to Hamas’ attack on October 7th, an Israeli military response was justified;
2) The number of Palestinian civilians that Israeli forces have killed (including via the deprivation of food assistance and medical aid), and the amount of essential infrastructure it has destroyed, is now disproportionate to its justified military objective of destroying Hamas;
3) Israel can fully accomplish its miliary objective if and only if it invades Rafah; and
4) The costs to innocent Palestinians of invading Rafah would be proportional to the benefits of Israel accomplishing its military objective of destroying Hamas.
To be clear, if Israel could not accomplish its war objective in a proportionate manner— where proportionality is calculated from now on—then neither view would consider it permissible to invade Rafah. In a world in which these four assumptions were true, however, there would be an important divide between proponents of the Aggregative View and proponents of the Prospective View. More specifically, proponents of the Aggregative View would insist that, since Israel’s offensive in Gaza has already inflicted the maximum number of civilian casualties that is proportionate to its justified military objective, it must end the war. In response, proponents of the Prospective View would respond that, even though Israel has already inflicted the maximum amount of damage on Palestinian civilians and essential infrastructure that is proportionate to its war objective, it could continue its military operations just as long as the havoc it would wreak by invading Rafah would be proportionate to its objective of destroying Hamas.
One challenge in discussing current events is that reality is generally more complex than our philosophical models. For instance, if one is resolutely opposed to the continuation of Israel’s military operations in Gaza, this might just as easily be explained by a lack of faith in the accomplishment of its military objective as opposed to the force of the Aggregative View. That being said, in thinking about the plight of the Palestinian people, I find it hard to dismiss Cécile Fabre’s argument that, if we adopt a Prospective view,
“proportionality would lose most of its bite as a constraint against killing…it would become permissible for any belligerent to inflict however many losses it thinks are required to win its war, so long as it would be in a position plausibly to declare…that from now on, it will manage to achieve victory at a cost.[2]
The way I would phrase Fabre’s point is that, if we adopt the Prospective View, the constraint against disproportionate wars as such loses much of its deliberative bite. Given our assumptions, proponents of both the Aggregative View and Prospective View will agree that Israel’s war as such is disproportionate to the accomplishment of its just military objective. To the adopter of the Aggregative View, the disproportionality of this war will require its immediate cessation. More specifically, to the adopter of the Aggregative view, the disproportionate loss of civilian life and destruction of essential infrastructure throughout Gaza generate a clear and irrefutable signal that not only have things gone horribly wrong but they also must not be made any worse. While the adopter of the Prospective View will concede that Israel’s war has gone horribly wrong, in her mind, the disproportionality of the war as such has no implications for the permissibility of its continuation. Instead, all that matters is whether the deaths of additional civilians (and international aid workers), with the attendant destruction of what remains of Gaza’s essential infrastructure, is proportionate to the military objective of eliminating Hamas.
To be clear, the proponent of the Aggregative View will be on the hook for an explanation of why we care about the proportionality of wars as such, as opposed to the proportionality of wars from now on. To me, this is the most interesting facet of this question that remains unresolved, and it points us right back toward questions relating to, for instance, punishment and taxation. Why do we care about the proportionality of a jail sentence as such, as opposed to simply the proportionality of a jail sentence from now on? Why do many of us think about the proportionality of annual taxes as such, as opposed to the proportionality of annual taxes from now to the end of the year? Most pressingly, why is it so hard to shake the idea that, in light of the excessive carnage that Israel has inflicted throughout Gaza, it must immediately stop killing Palestinian civilians and razing the foundations of their future?
While the proponent of the Aggregative View might owe us an answer to these questions, she can at least accommodate our moral concern with wars as such as opposed to simply wars from now on. Until and unless we are disabused of the notion that the proportionality of wars as such ought to have significant deliberative bite, the Prospective View will be out of sync with a wide range of ordinary judgments.
Sources
Fabre, Cécile. (2015). War Exit. Ethics, 125, 631-652.
Lazar, Seth. (2018). Moral Sunk Costs. The Philosophical Quarterly, 68:273, 841-861.
[1] Lazar (2018), p. 842.
[2] Fabre (2015), 637.