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Right on! Critical theory needs correctives such as this. For societies to progress towards the good - even if it's only an imprecise, tentative, experimental good - we must affirm what is good now, as well as posit the later good to aim for. Think of the Panegyric to the City of Florence (1403) by Leonardo Bruni (https://www.york.ac.uk/teaching/history/pjpg/bruni.pdf). It astutely praises the city of Florence and the prince, because praise modifies behavior better than criticism.

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this is fantastic,

some reactions in my idiosyncractic poetic terms (English as a first language speaker believe it or not)

"epistemically precarious: From within a bad world riddled with domination and ideology, we cannot grasp what a good society might look like. If we nevertheless attempt to do so, we will inevitably end up justifying and reproducing structures of domination."

I agree with you criticisms of this position. I call this the bad 'worlding' pothole where nothing but bad worlding happens in an increasingly negative or even nihilistic manner. It is worlding in that it puts all hope in some later future event, to which we can add nothing. This is a type of predestination. Calvin anyone?

"Second, I argue that appeals to ‘the good’ – i.e., to explicit and positive normative standards like human flourishing or social justice – are important for the project of critical theory. "

Good worlding must include itself.

This way various types of exclusive emotional gnosticisms, with increasingly cultic propensities, can be avoided, one is reminded of the various Manichean as well as the predestination tropes and their movements in (para-)Christian theologies. (Theologies are state sponsored worlding systems).

I agree that 'disciplining', is a part of good worlding, though policing might be a better term, (if policing can be considered a caring professional rather than a force). Discipline a bad choice of word as it is often the disciplines who go fully dogmatic, but the sense of training and review is what we are after here. Trial and error should not be discouraged because everything "is stuffed".

We may make mistakes in 'gooding' the good when we world, but without such mistakes we do not move at all. Movement leads to negotiation. We have an urge to move and make good, not so much for the detail or outcomes. Avoiding this urge "to should" the good, we basically avoid responsibility, but in avoiding that blame we avoid any chance at giving credit where it is due. We will fail to know ourselves.

Indiosyncratic Glossary: "to world" or "worlding" that part of our 'selfing' which is not ego-focused but is none-the-less negotiated by individuals among their others, and leads to outcomes such as art/morality/ethics/religion/polity depending on the complexity of the economy one's ecology can support.

The urge "to" world is still clearly seen in all the negativistic forms, and their doctrinal and dogmatic instantiations even when they try to avoid it (their avoidance is evidence of the urge).

Where they avoid doing this 'worlding' they can claim no responsibility or blame. WHy is this decision a good thing? Is it some type of utopian nihilism, or nihilistic utopianism, where emotionally they remain pure because they "know". (Pure land buddhism??) The reward will come later?

It is a dogmatic certainty, where it is not a refusal to become engaged in the world. A certainty which aims at (a moral) rectitude rather than living a life in which mistakes are made. It is nearly impossible to live without world, the question is how good is your "worlding", how do you cope with your mistakes. If you amputate the world from your self, yes, your cannot be blaming for falling over, but also, you cannot walk anywhere, and make new misteps, and learn… —and you won't use wheels because capitalism?? WTF.

You have successfully pointed out the mistakes in these negativistic positions.

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