Hi Mike. Many philosophers working on meaning in life accept objectivism about meaning in life. They think that there are facts about how objectively valuable certain things are and that the meaning of an individual’s life depends on those facts.
Imagine a Nazi who is passionate about the cause of Aryan domination and believes that their contributions to this cause make their life meaningful. An objectivist will say that this Nazi has the objective value facts wrong. Their life is not meaningful because the Nazi’s cause is not objectively valuable. An objectivist is happy to say that MLK’s life was more meaningful than the Nazi’s life regardless of what we think (i.e., even if we were all brainwashed to think that the Nazi lived a more meaningful life that would not change the fact the MLK’s life was in fact more meaningful).
Subjectivists reject this appeal to objective value. They hold that if the individual has the right kind of pro-attitudes then their life is meaningful. For example, a subjectivist might say that a life is meaningful to the extent that the person living it is passionate about what they do in their life, or loves and cares for something, or does what they believe to be really important. Subjectivists accept that the Nazi could be living a highly meaningful life (perhaps he is very passionate about advancing Nazi ideology).
Most forms of subjectivism also accept that meaning can be quantified and intersubjective comparisons can be made because there are objective facts about the extent to which various individuals are experiencing the relevant pro-attitudes (e.g., it might be true that you are more passionate about what you are doing in your life than I am, even if neither of us recognizes this).
Most forms of subjectivism also accept that people can be mistaken about how meaningful their lives are. For example, suppose that I am NOT passionate about what I am doing in my life but I nonetheless think that my life is highly meaningful in virtue of the fact that I am the descendant of a noble lineage of Lords and Kings. According to the “passion theory” of meaning in life, I am making a mistake when I judge that my life is meaningful. An exception to this is “simple subjectivism” about meaning in life. This says that your life is meaningful to the extent that you judge it to be meaningful. I am not aware of any philosophical defenses, in print, of simple subjectivism about meaning in life.
I did not mention this in the blog post, but in my article I say that the account of meaning in life I develop relies on two controversial assumptions that some will reject. The first is value pluralism—the thesis that there are multiple final values that contribute to the meaning and well-being of our lives. The second is objectivism—at least some of these final values are objective values. So, you are right to point out that anyone uncomfortable with these assumptions will “struggle” with my account.
Sometimes when I met a "my-dog-is-special" person, I count that as one good. Then I watch them go to work and then watch their dog bark and scare people as they also go to work and I say that's one bad, two bad, three bad…. o0h look that one got a really bad scare …11 bad plus 3 bad… ….and so on through the day, I don't know how to count all the bads all the constant barking does to peoples heads that I can't see, and then I watch them come home and have a good interaction with their dog, so that's two good and many many bads. I try to explain this to dog people and they just feel victimised, why don't you learn to like dogs, they may say, I say why don't you learn to not bark at people vicariously through your meat puppet dog all day long.
Hi Mike. Many philosophers working on meaning in life accept objectivism about meaning in life. They think that there are facts about how objectively valuable certain things are and that the meaning of an individual’s life depends on those facts.
Imagine a Nazi who is passionate about the cause of Aryan domination and believes that their contributions to this cause make their life meaningful. An objectivist will say that this Nazi has the objective value facts wrong. Their life is not meaningful because the Nazi’s cause is not objectively valuable. An objectivist is happy to say that MLK’s life was more meaningful than the Nazi’s life regardless of what we think (i.e., even if we were all brainwashed to think that the Nazi lived a more meaningful life that would not change the fact the MLK’s life was in fact more meaningful).
Subjectivists reject this appeal to objective value. They hold that if the individual has the right kind of pro-attitudes then their life is meaningful. For example, a subjectivist might say that a life is meaningful to the extent that the person living it is passionate about what they do in their life, or loves and cares for something, or does what they believe to be really important. Subjectivists accept that the Nazi could be living a highly meaningful life (perhaps he is very passionate about advancing Nazi ideology).
Most forms of subjectivism also accept that meaning can be quantified and intersubjective comparisons can be made because there are objective facts about the extent to which various individuals are experiencing the relevant pro-attitudes (e.g., it might be true that you are more passionate about what you are doing in your life than I am, even if neither of us recognizes this).
Most forms of subjectivism also accept that people can be mistaken about how meaningful their lives are. For example, suppose that I am NOT passionate about what I am doing in my life but I nonetheless think that my life is highly meaningful in virtue of the fact that I am the descendant of a noble lineage of Lords and Kings. According to the “passion theory” of meaning in life, I am making a mistake when I judge that my life is meaningful. An exception to this is “simple subjectivism” about meaning in life. This says that your life is meaningful to the extent that you judge it to be meaningful. I am not aware of any philosophical defenses, in print, of simple subjectivism about meaning in life.
I did not mention this in the blog post, but in my article I say that the account of meaning in life I develop relies on two controversial assumptions that some will reject. The first is value pluralism—the thesis that there are multiple final values that contribute to the meaning and well-being of our lives. The second is objectivism—at least some of these final values are objective values. So, you are right to point out that anyone uncomfortable with these assumptions will “struggle” with my account.
Sometimes when I met a "my-dog-is-special" person, I count that as one good. Then I watch them go to work and then watch their dog bark and scare people as they also go to work and I say that's one bad, two bad, three bad…. o0h look that one got a really bad scare …11 bad plus 3 bad… ….and so on through the day, I don't know how to count all the bads all the constant barking does to peoples heads that I can't see, and then I watch them come home and have a good interaction with their dog, so that's two good and many many bads. I try to explain this to dog people and they just feel victimised, why don't you learn to like dogs, they may say, I say why don't you learn to not bark at people vicariously through your meat puppet dog all day long.