I remember when Sissela Bok's evaluation of Lying was published way back when- over forty years ago. It was viewed in some quarters of the philosophical community (I was in grad school then) with a great deal of approval. Your work seems a carrying on of that line of inquiry with a more technical emphasis. I feel the issue of lying has some very profound depths- in essence it may distill into Philosophy of Mind theory. That said, it would appear people have a fuzzy modal morality, to wit: a recent President lied a great deal and his followers didn't care, for a larger game was afoot for them. Similarly, the same indifference to official misconduct by police is probably the norm rather than the exception, all of which argues consequentialism. People who encounter a new situation where choices must be made, are initially in a neutral "state" and may react either Kantean or utilitarian, depending on a very quick assessment. Very few are all one or the other and thats probably a good thing.
I remember when Sissela Bok's evaluation of Lying was published way back when- over forty years ago. It was viewed in some quarters of the philosophical community (I was in grad school then) with a great deal of approval. Your work seems a carrying on of that line of inquiry with a more technical emphasis. I feel the issue of lying has some very profound depths- in essence it may distill into Philosophy of Mind theory. That said, it would appear people have a fuzzy modal morality, to wit: a recent President lied a great deal and his followers didn't care, for a larger game was afoot for them. Similarly, the same indifference to official misconduct by police is probably the norm rather than the exception, all of which argues consequentialism. People who encounter a new situation where choices must be made, are initially in a neutral "state" and may react either Kantean or utilitarian, depending on a very quick assessment. Very few are all one or the other and thats probably a good thing.