Thanks for this great piece, Will! May I ask you a quick question about it? I haven’t read the journal article and perhaps you’ve answered my question there; in that case: sorry for the redundancy! Anyway, here is the question.
The application of the concept of a squircle leads to a contradiction, no matter to which particular case you apply the concept. The concept of truth is different in that its application leads to a contradiction only in some cases but in many (most?) cases it doesn’t lead to a contradiction. Doesn’t this make nihilism more difficult to defend in the case of the concept of truth? And would such a defense require a different kind of nihilism or, at least, different kinds of arguments than in the case of squircles?
You're spot on about the disanalogy between the squircle (and R-barber) case and the truth case! Does that make nihilism harder to defend in the case of truth? Well, it opens up the possibility that the account of truth we're considering (a sentence is true if and only if what it says is so) is generally correct, but permits of exceptions when it comes to problematic sentences like the sentence in capitals. People have certainly tried that route! This would be an example of the kind of revisionary account of truth I mentioned above - but it turns out it is extremely difficult to spell that idea out in a plausible, principled, and sufficiently general way. The nihilist challenge still stands, which is to say why we *need* such a revisionary account of truth. I talk about this a bit in the paper. I'm particularly thinking of the discussion on pp.316-7 about "those who reject premise (1)" and Objections 4, 5, and 11. But if that doesn't answer your question or you have any others, just let me know! :-)
How we do seem to tangle ourselves in our statements and assertions, which, when abstracted from our experience, leave us bound and gagged about the world we reside in (even the author of this essay).
If one claims that we (each and every Homo Sapiens) are unable to make a single true statement or assertion about anything-- not one-- that person is **claiming to have observed something true**, that applies to each and every Homo Sapiens- not a one of us can say anything true!
If one lucky Homo Sapiens utters one word of truth, Nihilism falls. No exceptions allowed, because upon encountering that first instance of a true statement, we can say as well that **true statements are possible**. So, that would be a second true thing said. But recall, the Nihilist claims to have encountered the one true thing, that we can establish the truth on nothing whatsoever. It's a head scratcher alright.
And of course, even the author of this essay takes for granted all the things about each day of their life that are (double entendre alert) unquestionably true. Unquestionably, because we choose not to interrogate the taken for granted parts of our day. Also unquestionably, because only through extensive contortions of idealized abstraction might we disavow the manifestly true state of affairs.
Can we properly interrogate our experience of all the manifestly true things that nevertheless escape our notice because of their unglamorous mundanity?
Assertions can be made, questions posed, by individuals. These are, of course, true statements. Not trivially, but fundamentally so. Like, the fundament of any discussion that purports to be philosophical.
One might as well claim that 'no utterance can be made' as claim 'no true statement is possible', because the declaration of falsity depends on the presence of the utterance, and other utterances in response, to begin with.
'Utterances were made' is a true statement. 'Not everyone is in agreement with every utterance' is a true statement.
The interesting question is not whether such true statements are possible (every claim of Nihilism, ironically, is rooted in such true statements), but **how it is possible for any of us to conceive of things that are not true?**
Mired in our corporeal existence, why are we not confined to concepts that accord with the simple facts of our existence?
But we're not stuck with the truth, and only the truth.
We can fabricate, dissemble, delude ourselves and mislead others, entertaining complex and erudite but still misguided notions.
And despite our sojourns into these fantastical realms we remain tethered to the fundament of unquestioned truths. You, me, anyone who reads the essay proffered, and everyone else.
Mind you, not everyone prefers to acknowledge that we are all tethered to this fundament of unquestioned truths, and that too is an interesting thing to consider-- why is it so compelling, so emotionally important to a person to claim 'No statement of truth is possible?'.
Thanks for this great piece, Will! May I ask you a quick question about it? I haven’t read the journal article and perhaps you’ve answered my question there; in that case: sorry for the redundancy! Anyway, here is the question.
The application of the concept of a squircle leads to a contradiction, no matter to which particular case you apply the concept. The concept of truth is different in that its application leads to a contradiction only in some cases but in many (most?) cases it doesn’t lead to a contradiction. Doesn’t this make nihilism more difficult to defend in the case of the concept of truth? And would such a defense require a different kind of nihilism or, at least, different kinds of arguments than in the case of squircles?
Thanks!
Hi Peter, thanks for the kind words!
You're spot on about the disanalogy between the squircle (and R-barber) case and the truth case! Does that make nihilism harder to defend in the case of truth? Well, it opens up the possibility that the account of truth we're considering (a sentence is true if and only if what it says is so) is generally correct, but permits of exceptions when it comes to problematic sentences like the sentence in capitals. People have certainly tried that route! This would be an example of the kind of revisionary account of truth I mentioned above - but it turns out it is extremely difficult to spell that idea out in a plausible, principled, and sufficiently general way. The nihilist challenge still stands, which is to say why we *need* such a revisionary account of truth. I talk about this a bit in the paper. I'm particularly thinking of the discussion on pp.316-7 about "those who reject premise (1)" and Objections 4, 5, and 11. But if that doesn't answer your question or you have any others, just let me know! :-)
thanks, Will!
Sure, if I can think of something (more than just to recommend to give up the idea of a general explanation), I'll let you know :-))
How we do seem to tangle ourselves in our statements and assertions, which, when abstracted from our experience, leave us bound and gagged about the world we reside in (even the author of this essay).
If one claims that we (each and every Homo Sapiens) are unable to make a single true statement or assertion about anything-- not one-- that person is **claiming to have observed something true**, that applies to each and every Homo Sapiens- not a one of us can say anything true!
If one lucky Homo Sapiens utters one word of truth, Nihilism falls. No exceptions allowed, because upon encountering that first instance of a true statement, we can say as well that **true statements are possible**. So, that would be a second true thing said. But recall, the Nihilist claims to have encountered the one true thing, that we can establish the truth on nothing whatsoever. It's a head scratcher alright.
And of course, even the author of this essay takes for granted all the things about each day of their life that are (double entendre alert) unquestionably true. Unquestionably, because we choose not to interrogate the taken for granted parts of our day. Also unquestionably, because only through extensive contortions of idealized abstraction might we disavow the manifestly true state of affairs.
Can we properly interrogate our experience of all the manifestly true things that nevertheless escape our notice because of their unglamorous mundanity?
Assertions can be made, questions posed, by individuals. These are, of course, true statements. Not trivially, but fundamentally so. Like, the fundament of any discussion that purports to be philosophical.
One might as well claim that 'no utterance can be made' as claim 'no true statement is possible', because the declaration of falsity depends on the presence of the utterance, and other utterances in response, to begin with.
'Utterances were made' is a true statement. 'Not everyone is in agreement with every utterance' is a true statement.
The interesting question is not whether such true statements are possible (every claim of Nihilism, ironically, is rooted in such true statements), but **how it is possible for any of us to conceive of things that are not true?**
Mired in our corporeal existence, why are we not confined to concepts that accord with the simple facts of our existence?
But we're not stuck with the truth, and only the truth.
We can fabricate, dissemble, delude ourselves and mislead others, entertaining complex and erudite but still misguided notions.
And despite our sojourns into these fantastical realms we remain tethered to the fundament of unquestioned truths. You, me, anyone who reads the essay proffered, and everyone else.
Mind you, not everyone prefers to acknowledge that we are all tethered to this fundament of unquestioned truths, and that too is an interesting thing to consider-- why is it so compelling, so emotionally important to a person to claim 'No statement of truth is possible?'.