I think that inceldom is a phenomenon of significant philosophical interest, and I hope that this paper helps draw forth further interest in it from philosophers. Nevertheless, I worry that the paper seems to generalize incels in a disparaging and overbroad way. One question I'd raise is how making sweeping claims about "what incels are after," on the basis of a manifesto by a single violent extremist, is in principle all that different from, for example, making sweeping claims about "what Muslims are after" on the basis of the words and actions of Osama bin Laden.
Perhaps you'd say that incels are, by definition, woman-haters (maybe among other things), and that this definitional or conceptual fact makes the disparaging generalizations more apt. If so, then I think that there are some further worries to be raised, though that would take us into a different debate.
I think that inceldom is a phenomenon of significant philosophical interest, and I hope that this paper helps draw forth further interest in it from philosophers. Nevertheless, I worry that the paper seems to generalize incels in a disparaging and overbroad way. One question I'd raise is how making sweeping claims about "what incels are after," on the basis of a manifesto by a single violent extremist, is in principle all that different from, for example, making sweeping claims about "what Muslims are after" on the basis of the words and actions of Osama bin Laden.
Perhaps you'd say that incels are, by definition, woman-haters (maybe among other things), and that this definitional or conceptual fact makes the disparaging generalizations more apt. If so, then I think that there are some further worries to be raised, though that would take us into a different debate.