"If ideal anarchism relies, even in principle, on mechanisms of social ostracism, the ideal state is – from a moral viewpoint – still better than the anarchic ideal society."
“According to [Ideal anarchists] the state can only be justified as a response to noncompliance with moral demands.”
Which ideal anarchist does this refer to? I am skeptical that they would accept this justification.
This quote takes for granted the unique status of the state. If noncompliance with moral demands “justifies” something, it justifies it for any person or organization, not just the state. The exception would be if the argument depends on predicates that apply only to the state. Advocates have not produced such predicates or arguments, that I am aware of.
An anarchist might count a state as “justified” if people consented to its actions. But this is a contradiction in terms, as there is nothing special about an organization that operates by consent, and one of the distinctive features of a state is the claim that they are exempt from the need to gain consent when dealing with persons.(Or for social contract theorists, the claim is that persons have implicitly consented to interactions with the state in advance. Either way, the unique feature of the state is this ability to proceed without gaining consent from others.)
“state institutions […] come with moral benefits that the anarchic ideal society lacks.”
Might the anarchic ideal society come with moral benefits that the ideal state society lacks? If it is possible at all, it seems likely that it would, but asking one to predict them specifically would be like asking someone to predict the Internet before the invention of the first computer.
Is “desirable social features” a good stand-in for “ moral benefits?” If not, it is not clear what is intended.
“First, state institutions relieve agents of […] the burden of actively giving something up that it would be beneficial for us to keep.”
It is not clear why anyone should wish to be so relieved. Presumably, there is some counterbalancing collective benefit. A more explicit argument would be more persuasive, but also easier to criticize.
“By attaching costs to noncompliance, state institutions align moral agency with rational self-interest, limiting the demands on the will justice places on us.”
No effort is taken to show that the state has an advantage in this. The reader must fill in the details of the argument for the author.
“Second, state institutions counter structural subordination that follows from differences in natural endowments.”
In theory, states could perhaps do this. In practice, it seems questionable. A much more detailed argument might establish that this is possible and that there are effective means to bring it about.
“whether the less endowed (in this specific sense) will get what is rightfully theirs or not will depend on the good will of the more endowed.”
And the state might rescue them, or might make things worse.
“ Only when such dependency is overcome by state institutions is our society free from structural domination.”
This is a conclusion without an argument or evidence. Perhaps it is meant to seem obvious? It takes for granted sociological insight that probably does not exist. It provides no clue how to induce the state to take such measures, even if we assume such measures exist and are known.
“Whether [ these gains outweigh the moral wrongs of coercion] is admittedly an open question.”
Why not examine that question?
“, since I assume that agents will be morally perfect I can, without being accused of employing double standards, assume that the state will be perfect as well, setting aside any risk of corruption or power abuse.”
How is it relevant to anything real, then?
“Could not informal mechanisms […] counter structural subordination and relieve agents of demands on the will just as well?”
If they apply to morally perfect agents, why not? Maybe because that assumption makes the exercise completely academic? Why discuss this useless motte, or the implied undefended bailey?
“ informal mechanisms […]come at a higher moral cost than state coercion. If ideal anarchism relies, even in principle, on mechanisms of social ostracism, the ideal state is – from a moral viewpoint – still better than the anarchic ideal society.”
Why would morally perfect agents ever have to ostracize each other?
This seems to account for only one side of the ledger. If we are discussing reality, the moral costs and benefits need to be counted more fully.
It is easier to destroy social value than to cultivate it. The state is a blunt instrument, not an ethically and methodologically valid experiment. The participants have not given informed consent, and there is no control group. Even if one is persuaded there is no fundamental alternative, that would not imply the sort of one-sided endorsement discussed here.
"While ideal statists and ideal anarchists agree that coercion is in itself morally wrong"
Not when in defence of liberty or its rectification after an infringement: https://jclester.substack.com/p/coercion-and-libertarianism
"If ideal anarchism relies, even in principle, on mechanisms of social ostracism, the ideal state is – from a moral viewpoint – still better than the anarchic ideal society."
With "ideal anarchism" there is presumably no need for "mechanisms of social ostracism". But even an "ideal state" will inherently infringe people's liberty: https://jclester.substack.com/p/anarchy-and-libertarianism
“According to [Ideal anarchists] the state can only be justified as a response to noncompliance with moral demands.”
Which ideal anarchist does this refer to? I am skeptical that they would accept this justification.
This quote takes for granted the unique status of the state. If noncompliance with moral demands “justifies” something, it justifies it for any person or organization, not just the state. The exception would be if the argument depends on predicates that apply only to the state. Advocates have not produced such predicates or arguments, that I am aware of.
An anarchist might count a state as “justified” if people consented to its actions. But this is a contradiction in terms, as there is nothing special about an organization that operates by consent, and one of the distinctive features of a state is the claim that they are exempt from the need to gain consent when dealing with persons.(Or for social contract theorists, the claim is that persons have implicitly consented to interactions with the state in advance. Either way, the unique feature of the state is this ability to proceed without gaining consent from others.)
“state institutions […] come with moral benefits that the anarchic ideal society lacks.”
Might the anarchic ideal society come with moral benefits that the ideal state society lacks? If it is possible at all, it seems likely that it would, but asking one to predict them specifically would be like asking someone to predict the Internet before the invention of the first computer.
Is “desirable social features” a good stand-in for “ moral benefits?” If not, it is not clear what is intended.
“First, state institutions relieve agents of […] the burden of actively giving something up that it would be beneficial for us to keep.”
It is not clear why anyone should wish to be so relieved. Presumably, there is some counterbalancing collective benefit. A more explicit argument would be more persuasive, but also easier to criticize.
“By attaching costs to noncompliance, state institutions align moral agency with rational self-interest, limiting the demands on the will justice places on us.”
No effort is taken to show that the state has an advantage in this. The reader must fill in the details of the argument for the author.
“Second, state institutions counter structural subordination that follows from differences in natural endowments.”
In theory, states could perhaps do this. In practice, it seems questionable. A much more detailed argument might establish that this is possible and that there are effective means to bring it about.
“whether the less endowed (in this specific sense) will get what is rightfully theirs or not will depend on the good will of the more endowed.”
And the state might rescue them, or might make things worse.
“ Only when such dependency is overcome by state institutions is our society free from structural domination.”
This is a conclusion without an argument or evidence. Perhaps it is meant to seem obvious? It takes for granted sociological insight that probably does not exist. It provides no clue how to induce the state to take such measures, even if we assume such measures exist and are known.
“Whether [ these gains outweigh the moral wrongs of coercion] is admittedly an open question.”
Why not examine that question?
“, since I assume that agents will be morally perfect I can, without being accused of employing double standards, assume that the state will be perfect as well, setting aside any risk of corruption or power abuse.”
How is it relevant to anything real, then?
“Could not informal mechanisms […] counter structural subordination and relieve agents of demands on the will just as well?”
If they apply to morally perfect agents, why not? Maybe because that assumption makes the exercise completely academic? Why discuss this useless motte, or the implied undefended bailey?
“ informal mechanisms […]come at a higher moral cost than state coercion. If ideal anarchism relies, even in principle, on mechanisms of social ostracism, the ideal state is – from a moral viewpoint – still better than the anarchic ideal society.”
Why would morally perfect agents ever have to ostracize each other?
This seems to account for only one side of the ledger. If we are discussing reality, the moral costs and benefits need to be counted more fully.
It is easier to destroy social value than to cultivate it. The state is a blunt instrument, not an ethically and methodologically valid experiment. The participants have not given informed consent, and there is no control group. Even if one is persuaded there is no fundamental alternative, that would not imply the sort of one-sided endorsement discussed here.